Page:Airmobility 1961-1971.pdf/65

General Norton directed each corps to make a special presentation on their helicopter operations at a critique on 5 and 6 July 1965. After the critique, separate study groups were formed to discuss in depth the enemy and the environment, airmobile operations from planning to execution, command and control and communications, and current prospective material. The meeting served to summarize the problems of airmobility during this period and possible solutions for the future.

General Norton's group noted that the Viet Cong were increasing their efforts to counter friendly airpower with larger caliber weapons and many reports indicated the introduction of the 12.7-mm machine gun into South Vietnam. It was reasonable to expect heavier antiaircraft weapons up to 37-mm in size to be introduced within the next six months.

The Viet Cong had learned more than a bit about the method of operation of Free World Forces and could well determine probable landing zones and the number of troops which could be brought in by one lift. Their antiaircraft weapons were now being centrally controlled and coordinated to deny the use of the most desirable landing zones and thereby channelize the airmobile forces into landing zones chosen and covered by the Viet Cong. In the latter zones, the Viet Cong forces tried to maintain favorable odds of four to one to the amount of Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces available to react against them. Even in 1965 it was envisioned that soon airmobile operations would be opposed by division-size units.

Combat intelligence for airmobile operations was woefully inadequate due to a multitude of inadequacies in Army of the Republic of Vietnam intelligence combined with restrictions imposed in U.S.-Army of the Republic of Vietnam advisory relations. The increased activity of the enlarged Viet Cong forces made the staging areas of airmobile forces increasingly vulnerable to surprise attacks. Fuel and ammunition depots were prime targets.

Increasing Viet Cong interdiction of main ground supply routes and the resultant dependency on air-delivered supplies was imposing a severe burden on available air cargo capabilities. It became evident that special command control had to be vigorously applied to ensure that critical air tonnage was not diluted by non-essential cargo.

General Norton's study group also highlighted one of the major problems of the early armed helicopters—the armed Huey because of its gross weight and additional drag was slower than the troop-carrying transport helicopters that it escorted. This meant that