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dispositions and installations as well as photographic coverage of prospective operational areas of the 25th Infantry Division.

b. A large volume of combat intelligence has been produced by visual sightings of troops in the open including weapon emplacements.

c. A bonus effect has been obtained from the defensive machine gun fire put down by the Mohawks when fired upon. Some VC casualties have been observed from these fires.

d. During the period 15 February to 8 March, artillery adjustment by Mohawk observers on VC troops sighted accounted for an estimated 65 enemy casualties. Combining these casualties with those noted in subparagraph c above, it is concluded that the Mohawk has either directly or indirectly caused more VC casualties during this period than all other military forces in Quang Ngai, including RVNAF air strikes.

Furthermore, I consider that the attack by the well equipped Q 95 VC Battalion in the Bato area on 3 March was relatively impotent. This was most probably due to actions by Mohawk aircraft on the days immediately preceding the attack. These aircraft were responsible for sighting and adjusting fire on large groups of armed VC within a few thousand meters of the scene of the attack.

Despite this fine performance, the full potential of the Mohawk aircraft cannot be realized because of the present test restrictions. I refer to the limitation of armament to the .50 cal machine guns.

The Mohawk aircraft consistently locate remunerative targets which are beyond the range of friendly artillery. The majority of these targets are small bodies of troops in the open. In counter-insurgency operations this is the type target most likely to be encountered. These are fleeting targets, and unless immediately engaged, will disperse and disappear. They are long gone before a friendly air strike can be mounted.

On the several occasions that the Mohawk has encountered and returned ground fire, the aircraft limitation to .50 cal machine guns has considerably curtailed the effectiveness of this defensive response. It is apparent that the addition of rockets, napalm and small fragmentation bombs would have greatly increased the number of VC casualties inflicted during the past few weeks. Further, this vastly increased fire-power capability would have a profound impact on the VC ability to conduct daylight troop movements. This would seriously hinder their tactical initiative, especially in Quang Ngai Province. It is also believed that this increased defensive firepower would enhance the surveillance capability of the aircraft by allowing greater low level freedom of movement.

It is my considered opinion that the Mohawks' success can be attributed to their immediate responsiveness to the commanders. In a counter-insurgency operation such as we have in Vietnam with its fleeting and elusive targets, the immediate and direct control over an