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full fuel load, a U.S. Army crew of four, armor plate, a tool box, a container of water, a case of emergency rations, weapons, armored vests for the crew, the Huey grossed 8,700 pounds, or 2,100 pounds over normal gross weight and 200 pounds over the maximum operational weight. Not only that, the center of gravity had shifted beyond safe limits. As a consequence, the standard procedure was to limit the UH-1B to eight combat troops except in grave emergencies. It was also directed that the armed helicopters would carry no more than the normal complement of five personnel and armament with the basic load.

It was the company commander's responsibility to insure that the helicopters were not overloaded and that they remained within maximum allowable weight and center of gravity limitations. However, because of operating requirements, the pilot was delegated this responsibility and would estimate the load to be lifted, supervise loading and tie-down, and insure that the aircraft was safe for flight. To verify the estimated safety factor, the helicopter was brought to a hover to check available cycling range and power prior to departure.

During 1963 the single most important factor in the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures for airmobile units in the Republic of Vietnam was the lack of significant enemy air defense capabilities, either ground or air. The ground-based threat was essentially hand-held small arms and automatic weapons fire. On rare occasions caliber .50 or 12.7-mm machine gun fire was encountered. The lack of heavy enemy air defense had much to do with the selection of flight altitudes. During this time frame, most flights were made at 1500 feet or higher to reduce the chances of being hit by ground fire. Contour flying was rarely performed. The Viet Cong continued to ambush landing zones, especially in mountains or mangrove areas where there was a very limited number of landing sites. On occasion, they would mine the area or drive stakes to prohibit landing. Most of the resistance, not surprisingly, was in the critical landing phase of an air assault mission.

The planning for an airmobile assault had evolved rather rapidly from the haphazard coordination witnessed in early 1962. Usually, this planning was initiated when the aviation battalion received a mission request from the Corps Tactical Operations Center. Missions were then assigned to the aviation companies by the aviation battalion commander. The companies usually received