Page:Airmobility 1961-1971.pdf/43
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EARLY YEARS IN VIETNAM
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fairly heavy losses. We must therefore find means of coping with the enemy's helicopter tactics. Widespread efforts must be directed to combatting heliborne landings and shooting at helicopters. Following are the advantages which the enemy enjoys due to his employment of heliborne strike tactics:
- 1. Careful planning and preparations are possible together with complete mobility in an attack, support or relieving role.
- 2. Secrecy can be preserved and surprise strikes can be accomplished.
- 3. Landings can be effected deep into our rear areas with the capability to attack and withdraw rapidly.
- 4. An appropriate means of destroying our forces while they are still weak.
However, these tactics suffer the following disadvantages:
- 1. The population in our rear areas is on our side and will resist the enemy in every way.
- 2. Small forces are usually employed by the enemy in their deep strikes and if counterattacked may find it difficult to withdraw.
- 3. Heliborne operations require the latest information (old info may have lost its timeliness and new info must be checked for accuracy). If the time is taken to acquire confirmatory info then the situation may have changed rendering the info inaccurate.
- 4. The enemy's strike elements are usually unfamiliar with the terrain and can easily be surrounded and rapidly defeated.
- 5. The present available helicopters prevent the enemy from employing large forces (although this is only a temporary disadvantage it will take the enemy some time before he will be able to overcome it.)
- 6. The effectiveness of heliborne tactics is greatly reduced in forested and jungle covered mountain areas where a clear knowledge of the nature of the terrain cannot be discerned from the air, where landings are difficult and ambushes easily employed against the landings.
- 7. The disadvantages inherent in helicopters are diffucult to overcome. If they are flown slow or low they are vulnerable to ground fire; every flying hour must be complemented by 3 hours ground maintenance; they cannot be flown for more than 70 hours in 2 or 3 days (TN: Obvious typographical error. 10 hours in 2 or 3 days seems appropriate); the helicopter consumes much fuel, carrying a full load of troops its fuel capacity is reduced and as a consequence its range is reduced, as a result the starting point for heliborne operations is usually near the objective and thus the enemy's element of surprise can be compromised. A landing right within our position is the most effective, but also subject to coming under our firepower while a landing outside of our position, though avoiding our firepower, loses the element of surprise.
It is obvious that the Viet Cong, in spite of all their polemics, had recognized that the advent of airmobility in Vietnam had changed the name of the game. True, the allies had much to learn about the employment of this new capability, but the war would never be the same.