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AIRMOBILITY


Huey as a troop lift bird, the Chinook with its larger capacity for resupply and movement of artillery, and the fledgling attack helicopter—these three together allowed us to take a giant step forward at this time.

From the time of the first major commitment of helicopters to Vietnam on 11 December 1961, until the buildup of major U.S. forces in 1965, airmobility was—like diplomacy—confined to the art of the possible. The early helicopters were old and unsuited for this particular mission; the rules of engagement were set by the South Vietnamese Government—a Government that was continually changing in a series of coups and counter-coups; and the Viet Cong was undergoing a phenomenal period of growth.

The primary mission of U.S. military forces was to advise and assist the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces to build a viable military structure to meet the needs of its national security. Because of the increasing scope and intensity of Viet Cong operations, this advisory task expanded very rapidly during this period. The Viet Cong regular force grew steadily from two to five regimental headquarters, the Viet Cong battalions doubled in the same period, and the quality and quantity of their weapons and equipment improved considerably. This build up necessitated the deployment of additional U.S. Army aviation units to support Government of Vietnam forces. From a single transportation battalion with three helicopter companies in early 1962, the U.S. Army developed an enormous operational and logistical support complex consisting of many battalions of helicopter companies, fixed-wing units, maintenance units, and special purpose organizations.


Enemy Reaction

It is interesting to note how the enemy viewed this increasing airmobility potential. The following is a translation of an extract from a North Vietnamese instruction pamphlet captured on 16 November 1962:

It can be said that all the recent augmentations of forces that the USA has sent to the Diem government were primarily intended to strengthen the Diem rear area forces, increase their ability to pass information rapidly and the wide employment of helicopters in the movement of troops. Therefore if we can destroy or greatly reduce the enemy's heliborne capability we will, in essence, have destroyed the mobility necessary to the US raid tactics.

Although we have succeeded in inflicting some loss on the enemy in his heliborne operations the enemy has in some places caused us