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There is no precise method to divide the Vientam War into convenient phases. However, from the standpoint of an airmobility study, one can consider the first phase as a learning period—a time when U.S. Army pilots were teaching Army of the Republic of Vietnam commanders and soldiers how to effectively employ helicopter tactics, while at the same time the pilots were learning by experience, trial and error. As more and more helicopters became available, we built additional aviation units to help the Vietnamese Army become as mobile as the enemy.

This second phase of the war was characterized by battalion-size air assaults of selected Vietnamese units, including the paratroopers, the rangers, and the regular infantry. It was the success of this phase that forced the enemy to increase his effort in South Vietnam. This proved to be something that the North Vietnamese Army was quite ready to do, and the improved capabilities of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam were matched step-by-step with increased resistance of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army, as additional units and supplies poured down the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex and across the border. It was during this second phase that we made great improvements on our tactical employment of helicopters. It was also during this period that we created our own airmobile division, tested it, and concluded that in terms of ground tactics, airmobility was here to stay. We studied the variety of tactics used by the Vietnamese and their U.S. support in these airmobile operations of extended scope and we tried to apply everything we learned to the organization and training of our airmobile units.

It was also during this second phase that the Huey came into its own. The turbine engine helicopter with its great power, its reliability, and its smaller requirement for maintenance, was the technological turning point as far as airmobility is concerned. Actually, the key improvement of technology was the trio of the