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the air cavalry combat brigade was to be airborne including its anti-tank capacity.
A distinct feature of the proposed air assault operations was the requirement for an increased use of support aircraft to carry supplies as far forward as the tactical situation would permit. The Board envisioned Caribous and Chinooks located in the forward Army area to deliver men, equipment, and supplies after Air Force aircraft had deposited them as far forward as possible.
The Board presented Mr. McNamera five alternative programs which would modernize the Army structure by replacing conventional forces by airmobile forces. Of the five programs the Board recommended its Alternate Three as the "most responsive to the requirement and most compatible with the Army's mission and overall structure." This program within six years would provide eleven Reorganization Objective Army Divisions, five air assault divisions, three air cavalry combat brigades, and five air transport brigades. It would also increase the mobility of other combat units and the effectiveness of their logistical support.
The Board emphasized the quantitative and qualitative improvements that would be necessary for Army aviation personnel programs. Its proposed alternative would require 8,900 aviators in 1963, growing to 20,600 in 1968. The Board foresaw an increased need for warrant officer pilots and recommended an officer to warrant officer ratio of one to one by the end of five years. It also recommended major changes in the officer career program to enhance their training, administration, and utilization.
In a letter prefacing the final report, General Howze commented that the job was in some respects incomplete and further testing was recommended. He said, "The foregoing does not indicate that I consider the Board's findings unvalidated or its judgment faulty. The time made available although not sufficient to prove all details of the Board's recommendations as respects organization, personnel, equipment, maintenance and doctrine, was quite sufficient to enable it, with conviction, to chart a course of action which will serve to increase markedly the combat and logistical efficiency of the Army." The Board was aware that its proposals were not infallible and that subsequent tests and developments could alter some elements of the proposed force structure. Therefore, the Board recommended a continuing program of field tests using the first units becoming operational under the activation schedule. It also recommended that progress on the Board's proposals be reviewed annually as a safeguard against any errors in