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committee used 150 Army aircraft, both rotary and fixed-wing, for eleven weeks, augmented by aircraft support from the U.S. Air Force. About fifty officers designed, controlled, and evaluated the tests assisted by an advisory group of civilian scientists.

The Board conducted approximately forty tests ranging in magnitude from fairly elaborate live-fire exercises and three major week-long exercises against an assumed force of irregulars to auxiliary tests of new items of equipment. Results of the three largest tests indicated that Army aircraft would enhance combat effectiveness in both conventional and counter-guerrilla actions and that Army tasks could be accomplished by smaller forces in shorter campaigns.

The final report of the Howze Board was submitted on 20 August 1962. The air assault division was the principal tactical innovation. As compared with about one hundred aircraft in the standard division, it would have 459. Airmobility would be achieved by extensive reduction in ground vehicles from 3,452 down to 1,100 which would also reduce the airlift requirement for strategic deployment. Despite the reduction in total number of vehicles the cost of the new division, based upon the initial investment and a five-year operating cost, was about half again the cost of an infantry division. Artillery consisted of only 105-mm howitzers and Little John rockets (airtransportable in the Chinook helicopter). Augmenting this greatly reduced firepower, the division would employ twenty-four armed Mohawks and 36 Huey helicopters armed with 2.75-inch rockets.

The aircraft of the division could lift one third of its assault elements at one time. Three brigade headquarters provided major tactical sub-divisions to which the fighting battalions and support elements would be assigned according to the nature of the task and the terrain. The brigades in turn could mix units assigned to them as could the battalions and to a lesser extent the subordinate units of the battalions. All the essential elements of combat power—maneuver forces, reconnaissance, firepower, communications, and service support—were present.

The Board also recommended the organization of an air cavalry combat brigade having 316 aircraft, 144 of which would be attack helicopters. Its function was the classical one for cavalry—to screen, reconnoiter, and wage delaying actions. Unlike the air assault division which was designed to join battle on the ground, all of