Page:Airmobility 1961-1971.pdf/36

[pro]vide appropriate support and assistance as required to Continental Army Command and the Board.

Within a week after Secretary McNamara's memorandum of 19 April, Continental Army Command appointed General Howze, Commanding General of the Strategic Army Corps and of the XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, as president of the ad hoc U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board to conduct a reexamination of the role of Army aviation and aircraft requirements. On 25 April Continental Army Command contacted General Howze to alert him of the job to be done, outlined preliminary instructions, and provided pertinent details. The formal directive dated 3 May was not issued until the Board had begun work. In fact, General Howze did not read it until 5 May. Continental Army Command warned General Howze that the deadlines were extremely demanding. On 25 April, the same day on which General Howze was notified that he was to form the Board, General Decker, Chief of Staff of the Army, informed his staff of the establishment of the Board and outlined the Board's purpose and function, composition, direction and control, and administrative procedures. His directive formalized the verbal instructions previously given.

General Howze initial reaction was that the magnitude of the job and the consideration of avoiding false starts might prohibit the Board from accomplishing all of the assigned tasks by the deadline. For example, he believed that exercises and troop tests should be continued beyond that time frame to further refine requirements for aircraft and of the matériel. However, he felt that within the time limitation the Board could arrive at most of the essential conclusions and provide a conservative estimate of the proper program on which the Army could embark without wasting assets.

General Howze was free to convene portions of the Board at installations other than Fort Bragg if convenient. He could organize the Board as he saw fit. Within the first few days of May, aviation units and support elements awaited his bidding, funds had been earmarked, and instructions had been issued to insure that supply and maintenance priorities were clearly understood throughout the Army. General Howze was free to deal directly with the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, the other military services, government agencies, and civilian industry for coordination on the technical aspects of his evaluation. Seldom has there ever been such a broad and open-end charter in military history.