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B. Richardson, and Robert R. Williams; Colonels John Norton and Alexander J. Rankin; and Mr. Frank A. Parker, Jr., President of the Research Analysis Corporation, Dr. Edwin W. Paxson of the RAND Corporation, and Mr. Edward H. Heinemann, a well-known aviation consultant.
Secretary McNamara summed up the emphasis he placed on the Army reexamination of tactical mobility this way: "I shall be disappointed if the Army's reexamination merely produces logistically oriented recommendations to procure more of the same, rather than a plan for employment of fresh and perhaps unorthodox concepts which will give us a significant increase in mobility."
This benchmark in airmobility history resulted from the fortunate confluence of several trends: first, the personal dissatisfaction of the Secretary of Defense with the Army's failure to exploit the potential capabilities of airmobility; secondly, an undeniable attitude of many office of the Secretary of defense civilian analysis who looked upon the service staffs and most officers as reluctantly being dragged into the twentieth century; third, there was a nucleus of Army aviation oriented officers both in the office of the Secretary of Defense staff and Army Staff who recognized the possibility of capitalizing on Mr. McNamara's attitude to sweep aside ultraconservative resistance within the Army itself. Finally, there was an opportunity to present to the Secretary of Defense for his signature directives that would cause the Army to appoint an evaluation bye individuals known for their farsightedness and to submit recommendations directly to the Secretary of Defense in order to avoid intermediate filtering. For the record, it should be noted that General Howze knew nothing of this background maneuvering and would have sternly protested had he been aware.
The Army Vice Chief of Staff immediately alerted the General Staff of Secretary McNamara's requirements. The staff suggested the appointment of a board of general officers and selected civilians with subordinate working groups similar to the organization of the Rogers Board. Department of the Army directed General Herbert B. Powell, Commanding General, Continental Army Command, to establish the Board which would have three suspense dates to meet. On 10 May 1962 the Board would submit an outline plan of how it would conduct its review, including an estimate of funds required. Beginning 1 June the Board would submit monthly progress reports and by 24 August a final report incorporating a recommended program for development and procurement of Army aircraft. Department of the Army directed other agencies to pro[vide]