Page:Airmobility 1961-1971.pdf/34
Analysts in the Office of the Secretary of Defense reviewed the Army's submission during January and February 1962. Their review was extremely critical of the Army's so-called caution. Key action officers prepared a draft for Mr. McNamara which would have a long-range effect on the structure of the Army.
On 19 April 1962 Mr. McNamara sent a now famous memorandum to the Secretary of the Army in which he stated he felt the Army's program was dangerously conservative. He believed the procurement program fell short of meeting requirements and failed to give a rationale for an optimum mix of aircraft types. The staff paper supporting the memorandum listed three major criticisms of the Army aviation program. First, OSD did not think the Army had fully explored the opportunities offered by technology to break their traditional ties to surface mobility. Second, they claimed that air vehicles operating close to the ground offered a possible quantum increase in effectiveness. Third, they stated that air transportation, all things considered, was less costly than rail or ship transportation even in peacetime, and wartime urgency would make it even more important. Therefore, the OSD staff stated that the Army needed a major effort to exploit the aeronautical potential and increase its effectiveness vis-a-vis ground transportation systems.
The Secretary believed the Army needed to re-examine its aviation requirements with a bold "new look" at land warfare mobility. Though previous studies had produced doctrinal concepts, action was needed to carry the concepts into effect. Studies of air vehicles were needed also. He directed the re-examination of tactical mobility requirements divorced from traditional viewpoints and past policies, and free from veto or dilution by conservative staff review. He felt the Army should be willing to substitute airmobile systems for traditional ground systems if it would improve capabilities and effectiveness. The final objective of the re-examination was to recommend action which would give the Army the maximum attainable mobility in the combat area within the bounds of aeronautical technology, within alternative funding levels.
The Secretary of Defense directed that the results of re-examination be presented in terms of cost effectiveness and transport effectiveness, and that full use be made of field tests and exercises. Mr. McNamara urged Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr, Jr. to give the matter his personal attention and, in a most unusual departure from accepted procedure, suggested the following individuals to manage the Army's effort: Lieutenant General Hamilton H. Howze, Brigadier Generals Delk M. Oden, Walter