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simple combat airplane for close support, while General White defended the Air Force viewpoint that a multi-purpose aircraft could do the job better and also perform as an air defense weapon. The rest of the conversation centered about the Army's testing of certain jet aircraft for deep surveillance. Finally, the problems of command and control of two distinct systems—Air Force and Army—were discussed.
General White and General Decker closed the session with a resolution to have Major General David A. Burchinal and Major General Barksdale Hamlett work on more specific agreements between the Air Force and the Army. The two Chiefs of Staff closed the session with the following remarks:
General White: We waste more money; we waste time; we waste energy; and we waste dispositions. I doubt that we will solve all our problems but I am certainly for solving as many of them as we can. General Decker: Well, I am too. We will go halfway or even more. I will say this, that there is a group around this city not confined to the Army, who think the Army is not doing itself justice for coming out and making a pitch to take over some of these things such as tactical air support. I won't agree with them. I think as long as the Air Force has the mission and can do it they ought to do it. We don't want to take it over, but there is that kind of pressure as you probably know. I want you to know that that is not my position.
The Air Force and the Army differences brought out in the briefing just described were not to be entirely solved during the next decade, but many problems between the services disappeared in the crucible of combat. Working agreements between those actively engaged in battle were developed and standardized. But the fundamental differences remained between those who viewed aviation as an end in itself and those who saw aviation merely as a means to free the ground soldier from the "tyranny of terrain."
Reviewing the Army's position in 1960, a full year before the first helicopter companies landed in Saigon, it should be noted that the Army was well along its way in airmobility. At the time it had the following basic objectives: each division to have the capability of moving at least a company of Infantry by its organic airlift; aerial surveillance to match the firepower of the unit at each echelon; rapid purification of the aircraft inventory to reduce the types of aircraft to the minimum; acquisition of a limited number of flying cranes; and, increased logistical capabilities as represented by the Caribou and Chinook team and any possible successor. It is important to view these objectives in their proper time frame for they were not necessarily geared to the prospect of an increased involvement in Vietnam, but rather to a new Army