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GROWTH OF THE CONCEPT

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Force strategists. It could carry as much as the venerable C-47 and land and take off of remarkably short unimproved airstrips. It had a rear end loading door which facilitated rapid cargo handling and was relatively easy to maintain and operate. The Air Force saw this 32 passenger aircraft as a second invasion of its domain and the projected rise of the Army's inventory at a time that the Air Force inventory was declining was bound to cause more heat than light.^[1]

The Caribou proved to be an extremely useful addition to the United States aircraft inventory and did yeoman service in Vietnam. Later it would be transferred to the Air Force in 1966 as part of another Army-Air Force agreement, but in the early 1960's the Caribou and the Mohawk were the two major symbols of Army-Air Force disagreement and more time was devoted to these systems than to the entire airmobility concept itself.

The question and answer period that followed the briefing began with a discussion about the Russians' effort in the helicopter field and the Russians' method of organizing their aviation. General White then turned to the growth of aviation in the United States Army and got to the heart of the meeting. To the obvious dismay of some Air Force staff officers, he said,

I don't disagree with the Army concept. Obviously there is always going to be the clash of budgetary impingements. Your idea of supplying yourselves and this "Sky Cav," I can't quarrel with. But what worries me and must worry you for other reasons is what does the future hold. Two of these airplanes are probably as big as our bombers were eighteen or twenty years ago. What does the future hold? How do we get along, because the air does clash at a certain point? How do we work this out?

General Decker indicated that Army aviation would take up where the Air Force left off and that he was perfectly happy to leave it that way—provided the Air Force provisioned the necessary airlift and tactical air support to complement the Army's need. The conversation then shifted to the type of close air support that the Army felt was best. General Decker espoused a single-purpose,

↑ The very existence of the Caribou in the Army inventory changed one Air Force program—the Fairchild C-123 "Provider." This latter aircraft was scheduled to be phased out of the active Air Force inventory in 1961, with a few programmed to the reserves and the remainder to be declared surplus. When Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara suggested that the Air Force turn over the C-123's to the Army (to train on this type aircraft prior to the receipt of the Caribou), the Air Force suddenly discovered new and pressing Air Force requirements for the C-123. Thus the Army Caribou protagonists not only pushed the Caribou from being, but—incidentally—saved the C-123 for much-needed duty in Vietnam.

[ref1-1] The very existence of the Caribou in the Army inventory changed one Air Force program—the Fairchild C-123 "Provider." This latter aircraft was scheduled to be phased out of the active Air Force inventory in 1961, with a few programmed to the reserves and the remainder to be declared surplus. When Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara suggested that the Air Force turn over the C-123's to the Army (to train on this type aircraft prior to the receipt of the Caribou), the Air Force suddenly discovered new and pressing Air Force requirements for the C-123. Thus the Army Caribou protagonists not only pushed the Caribou from being, but—incidentally—saved the C-123 for much-needed duty in Vietnam.

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