Page:Airmobility 1961-1971.pdf/274
[develop]ment of this perspective requires considering similarities which exist among the survivabilities of all combat elements to include Army air vehicles. The survivability of Army aircraft is enhanced by suppressive ground fire support, close air defense support, the proper use of intelligence for planning aviation operations, the effect of tactic and techniques on increased survivability, the soldier's desire to accomplish his mission, and the effect of personal command attention. Since Army aircraft operate in the ground environment, proven techniques of ground survival are available to them; and, the most effective of these techniques is the co-ordinated use of all his capabilities by a commander on the scene. What is germane is the fact that the American soldier is more capable of carrying out his mission and more likely to survive in combat because he is airmobile.
Throughout this study we have tried to emphasize the "man" portion of the man-machine equation. However, I'd like to reiterate a few of the equipment lessons that seem exceedingly important during future procurement decisions. History has proven that the tools of combat are seldom if ever, used in the exact manner which their designer had conceived. For example, the Huey began life as an air ambulance. Therefore, it is essential that today's developer, in laying the keels for the next generation, design the most useful tools, so that some future commander will have available a flexible arsenal that he can adapt to his war.
The Army's decision to standardize on a utility tactical transport helicopter has far-reaching implications on every operation from its planning to its execution. Literally hundreds of our key battles could not have been fought without a light, agile machine that could go into improbable landing zones at a critical time. Had the Army chosen to build its airmobile tactics around a "platoon carrier," different and less flexible tactics would have been forced on our commanders. As we move to replace the Huey fleet, we must never lose sight of the essential characteristics that made the Huey invaluable to the Infantry commander. Technology offers so many tempting alternatives that one can easily forget the basic problems of squad tactics. The vital lessons which we learned in the "sizing" of our helicopter fleet dare not be forgotten.
Similar principles must be kept in mind in our future helicopter gunships. There is no doubt that from a hardware standpoint, the armed helicopter was the single greatest innovation of Vietnam. I trust this volume has provided enough examples to leave no doubt about its place in the support of the ground soldier. The introduction of