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because each Service is able to promote less of a capability, at least in qualitative terms, than is militarily desirable. This is especially true as we look to more sophisticated threats throughout the world. In my estimation, quantitative duplication is a myth, because seldom will relatively scarce and expensive vehicles such as aircraft be adequate to meet all requirements.
Another myth—one that has haunted Army aviation for thirty years—is vulnerability. Throughout this volume we have touched on various aspects of the vulnerability of Army aircraft and, in particular, the helicopter. Nevertheless, the subject is still uppermost in the minds of those who have honest reservations on the soundness of future airmobile tactics.
When I began the research for this study, I sent letters to fifty senior officers requesting their personal comments and experience on the subject of airmobility. Many of their thoughts have been incorporated in this volume. Only one letter, from Lieutenant General Arthur S. Collins, Jr., voiced serious doubts about the future of the airmobile concept. In his detailed analysis, which is an important part of the bibliography, General Collins listed nine major strengths of the airmobile concept; however, he still believed that "the fundamental weakness of the helicopter, and therefore the entire airmobile concept, is its vulnerability to ground-to-air fire." I disagree. But such concern cannot be lightly dismissed. Those charged with the responsibility of planning our future force structure must weigh very carefully their decisions on the type and amount of airmobile organizations against the possible contingencies. In the preface to this volume I stated that airmobility was no panacea. Some of the operations in Vietnam showed that there were higher risks involved for higher gains. I submit that the entire strategy in Southeast Asia would have had to be revised downward if we had not had airmobile organizations, imperfect though they were.
The key word for airmobile operations is "survivability," not "vulnerability." Survivability of air vehicles in the land battle is one end product of a combination of actions and reactions by two opposing forces. The kinds of battlefield actions and reactions are many and varied, beginning with intelligence production and planning and ending with the last shot fired. Survivability of aircraft can be appreciated only by examining all of these influences in their proper relationship to each other.
The oft-studied subject of vulnerability, which is only one input to survivability, has to be recast in proper perspective with regard to other equally or more important contributors. The develop[ment]