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a flexibility which is much more difficult to initiate and accomplish when non-divisional units are involved. This is particularly true of air cavalry. More than any other unit, the air cavalry development in Vietnam has proven the need for quick reaction to meet the demands of the situation as seen by the commander on the scene. Adaptation to a change in environment is more feasible and more likely when the unit is organic.

The airmobile division commander is able to plan a complete campaign based on airmobility as opposed to a campaign which, as an incidental element, employs airmobile assets in some of its battle plans. As a corollary, I know of no other major organization besides the airmobile division where the commander is willing to consistently commit all his forces on a day-to-day basis; that is, not keep the traditional reserve. The airmobile division commander knows that he can extract a reserve out of his deployed units as needed because he has the assets and the training to do so. This is a major economy of force.

By changing our perspective from that of the division commander to the individual soldier, we can perceive one of the often forgotten advantages of airmobility. It is ironic to me, after the millions spent to reduce a few pounds from the infantryman's rifle, that many soldiers would end up carrying as much (or more) total weight as the doughboy of World War I. A soldier when he exits a helicopter becomes the Army's most important extension of the airmobile concept; and his individual load should consist of the bare essentials needed for the next few hours—basically ammunition and water. To avoid the classic soldier's syndrome of holding on to everything he owns, the 1st Cavalry Division developed a technique for keeping all the personal equipment of the individual in squad bundles that were consistently delivered when needed. This was a tremendous boost to morale as well as a very real increase in effectiveness. However, this seemingly simple technique has to be relearned several times in every campaign.

In reviewing this volume, I sense that I could have spent more time emphasizing the natural affinity of armor with an airmobile force. When the terrain and circumstances permit, armor and airmobility complement each other in a natural way to form an unbeatable team. Airmobility gives the commander unique capabilities in reconnaissance, maneuver, and logistics while the armor gives the shock and firepower which have characterized it in the past. Air cavalry and airmobile infantry can find and fix the enemy so that armored and mechanized forces can be brought in at the decisive moment to finish him. There is no precise balance of these