Page:Airmobility 1961-1971.pdf/270

[special]ized airmobile divisions. In the latter years, especially 1967 and 1968, there were enough aviation assets to satisfy almost every requirement for airmobility in every division. Many of the non-airmobile divisions, and rightly so, were very proud of their air assault techniques and had developed highly refined operating procedures with their supporting aviation companies. The question then arises as to the need for a special organization which has over 400 helicopters assigned to it on a full-time basis.

However, there is much more to airmobility than just using helicopters. The Huey, the Cobra, the light observation helicopter, and the Chinook were the essential vehicles of airmobile combat and combat support. But, the essence of an airmobile division is the ability to integrate the capabilities of these aircraft into an organization designed for their use by people specially trained for their use. This total integration is only possible in a unit which "owns" its helicopters.

This is not to detract from the effectiveness of non-airmobile units for they possess certain characteristics which give them advantages in certain situations. A division which has tank or mechanized battalions or ground cavalry squadrons has certain advantages over the airmobile division. The same thing is true for the heavier weapons which are organic to the infantry division. Conversely, the lighter weapons and vehicles of the airmobile division are essential for the advantages which it possesses. This study has detailed the strategic moves of the 1st Cavalry Division from II Corps to I Corps to III Corps Tactical Zones, and touched upon the many brigade and battalion moves involving airlift. In all these moves, I was struck by the distinct advantage in moving inherently lean airmobile forces as compared to the airlift requirement of other organizations.

The tactical advantages of the airmobile division can be summed up as follows: increased efficiency due to the repeated association of units; thorough integration of its assets because of close association and command relationships has a direct and distinct impact on the quality of support. There is no denying that general support units rarely tend to identify closely with the supported unit, at least not as closely as organic units. This is a simple truism of human nature.

The epitome of "superior" airmobile tactics, as contrasted with "good," is the capability to exploit not only an opportunity but the trends and changing patterns in enemy activity. This requires