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multiple mutual supporting positions. The enemy not only had large numbers of antiaircraft weapons of several calibers, but he used these weapons in a manner specifically designed to counter airmobile operations.
The North Vietnamese Army soldier enjoyed a considerably greater fire support in Laos than he previously experienced in South Vietnam and his antiaircraft weapons had been carefully positioned over a period of years. The 12.7-mm weapons were often employed in triangular or rectangular formations in the vicinity of high ground approximately 1,000 meters from a potential landing zone. The 23-mm guns were employed in circular or triangular formations, though on occasion a single gun was used to protect storage sites or vital road networks. The extensive enemy threat was compounded by the fact that his antiaircraft weapons were continually redeployed, usually on a day-to-day basis.
One enemy tactic that proved most difficult to counter was the North Vietnamese Army technique of employing 10- to 12-man combat teams—on or near every piece of critical terrain—protected by bunkers and trenches. These small teams, armed with one or two machineguns and 82mm mortar and one or two rocket launchers, attacked allied aircraft and infantry on virtually every landing zone, pick up zone, and friendly troop position within the range of their weapons.
The enemy also used their "hugging" tactic which had proven effective in earlier encounters. Using this tactic, North Vietnamese Army forces sometimes moved to within 10 to 20 meters of friendly units manning perimeters and securing positions. Friendly forces were often reluctant to bring supporting fires close enough to their own positions to harm the enemy and, consequently, the close-in enemy could direct a heavy volume of short-range small arms, antiaircraft weapons, and rocket launcher fire against helicopters flying in and out of friendly positions. On occasion, helicopters were fired at and hit by North Vietnamese Army riflemen lying on and back inside of barb wire barriers surrounding a friendly position.
Because of the ever-present enemy threat, every airmobile operation in LAMSON 719—even single ship resupply and medical evacuation missions—had to be planned and conducted as a complete combat operation. This entailed a separate fire plan, allocation of escorting armed helicopters, and contingency plans for securing and recovering downed crews and aircraft.
The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), under the command of Major General Thomas M. Tarpley, was given the mission to