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whether the airmobility concept failed or succeeded in this important test.
The average American citizen could not help but conclude from the headlines that the helicopter had proved to be an unacceptable combat vehicle. Many reporters picked up random stories from anyone willing to talk and the overall picture was grim. The following excerpt from Newsweek, 15 March 1971, was more objective than most:
To the modern American cavalryman of the air, the plunge into Laos has been something like an old-time charge on horseback: admirably heroic, stunningly effective—and terribly costly. For four weeks now, American helicopter pilots have flown through some of the heaviest flak in the history of the Indochinese war. One day alone last week, the Army admitted to losing ten aircraft to the unexpectedly heavy North Vietnamese ground fire, and there were reports from the field that the actual losses had been much worse. As a result, the customary bravado of the American chopper pilot was beginning to wear a bit thin. "Two weeks ago," said one gunship skipper, "I couldn't have told you how much time I had left to serve in Vietnam. Now I know that I've got 66 days to go, and I'm counting every one." Another flier added anxiously: "The roles are reversed over there. In Vietnam, you have to hunt for the enemy. But in Laos, man, they hunt for you."
Despite the risks, it was inevitable that U.S. helicopter should be deeply involved in the Laotian campaign, for more than any other artifact of war, the chopper has become the indelible symbol of the Indochina conflict. Helicopter pilots were among the first Americans killed in the war a decade ago, and, under President Nixon's Vietnamization program, they will probably be among the last to leave. In the years between, the chopper's mobility and firepower have added a radically new dimension to warfare, and the daring young American pilots have scooped up their Silver Stars, Distinguished Flying Crosses and Air Medals by the bushel—along with Purple Hearts. In the opinion of many military experts, the helicopter has been the difference between a humiliating U.S. defeat in Vietnam and whatever chance remains of attaining some more satisfactory outcome.
To put the story of airmobility during LAMSON 719 into focus, it's necessary to examine the threat. With the exception of enemy air, it could be said that the environment in Laos was as hostile and as sophisticated as most of the probable areas of employment of U.S. forces throughout the world. The North Vietnamese Army had skillfully deployed an extensive well-integrated, highly mobile air defense system throughout the entire operational area. Whereas in Vietnam and Cambodia we had operated against 7.62-mm and limited 12.7-mm fire, with occasional concentrations of the latter, operations in Laos had been regularly opposed by 23-mm, 37-mm and 57-mm weapons, while the 12.7-mm guns were employed in