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The work of the Rogers Board was symptomatic of a renaissance throughout many segments of the Army—in its schools and its fighting units. As an example of the latter, Lieutenant Colonel Russell P. Bonasso, the Aviation Officer of the 101st Airborne Division, made what could be called a drastic organizational proposal in 1960. After studying the fragmented aviation assets in the division, he briefed the Commanding General, Major General William C. Westmoreland, on the advantages of centralized control. At the conclusion of a lengthy discussion, General Westmoreland authorized the formation of the 101st Combat Aviation Battalion (Provisional)—the first such organization in the Army.

The early development of the airmobile concept was not without controversy. As the direct result of the experiences in Korea and the disagreements over Army aviation between the Air Force and the Army, Secretaries Frank Pace, Jr. of the Army and Thomas K. Finletter of the Air Force signed a special Memorandum of Understanding dated 2 October 1951. Under the terms of this document organic Army aircraft would be used by the Army "as an integral part of its components for the purpose of expediency and improving ground combat and logistics procedures within the combat zone." Detailed functions under the exclusive control of the ground force commander which might be performed by Army organic aircraft were spelled out in this Magna Carta of Army aviation. Predictably this did not settle the so-called roles and missions issues between the Services. Other memoranda were follow.

The Air Force witnessed the rapid growth of Army aviation during the 1950's. From 668 light airplanes and 57 light helicopters that comprised the Army inventory on 30 June 1950, it saw the Army acquire over 5,000 aircraft of fifteen different varieties by 1960. The Air Force had watched the Army become the acknowledged leader in vertical flight and ground effects machines. Against strenuous objections, the Army had "borrowed" three Air Force T-37 jets for testing and a number of Army aviators were being qualified in various transonic aircraft from other Services and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Worst of all, the Air Force found itself with a growing number of "technologically unemployed" pilots and they heard themselves described in front of a Congressional committee as the "silent silo-sitters-of-the-seventies."