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unique in many ways, but of principal concern to this study was the impression, generated both in and out of the military by the early reports of severe helicopter losses, that the airmobile concept had "fallen flat on its face"—that airmobility brought unacceptable risks when subject to any threat more than low-intensity antiaircraft fire in the "permissive" environment of South Vietnam. As is so often the case, the impact of the initial headlines remained uncorrected by the later objective review of the facts. Many believed that this operation was nothing short of a disaster when, in fact, it proved again the basic soundness of the airmobile concept and scored a devastating blow to the enemy's logistics sanctuary in Laos.

In the next few pages I've made no attempt to relate the full story of LAMSON 719—the detailed ground battle between the communist forces and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. That is properly a Vietnamese story—to be recounted elsewhere. For the record, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam fought tenaciously against ever-increasing odds and reached their objective. The Laos operation was a tactical and strategic success, as well as a psychological success, for the Republic of Vietnam.

Before one draws any comparisons between the Laos operations and airmobile operations conducted by the U.S. Army, it must be realized that LAMSON 719 was a very special operation in which strict rules governed U.S. military operations across the Laotian border. While the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces could operate freely on the ground and in the air within Laos, U.S. Forces were restricted to air operations under specific rules of engagement and were prohibited from fighting on the ground.

The fact that U.S. personnel were forbidden to go on the ground in Laos required modification of normal procedures for supporting firepower, coordination and conduct of airmobile operations, and rescue and recovery of downed crews and aircraft. The absence of U.S. advisors with the ground forces and the language difficulties added further complications.

Furthermore, LAMSON 719 was a combined operation in which Lieutenant General Hoaug Xuan Lam, the Commanding General, I Corps, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, planned and conducted the ground operations in Laos while Lieutenant General James W. Sutherland, the Commanding General, XXIV Corps, U.S. Army, planned, co-ordinated, and conducted airmobile and aviation operations in support of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces ground operations. Though these two commanders developed a high order of co-operation and mutual confidence, there was an absence of the