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the air cav. But when we began supporting ARVN divisions with air cav (and the air cav under my OPCON), I then gave the ARA battalion the additional mission of supporting this air cav. What I had in essence was an Air Cavalry Combat Brigade as originally conceived by the Howze Board. This proved to be tremendously successful in supporting the ARVN in Cambodia.
During this same period in late 1970 the 1st Cavalry Division introduced new airmobile tactics in using the 81-mm mortar. The 81-mm mortar, long a valuable weapon to the Infantry, was used by the 1st Cavalry to support strike operations outside of tube artillery range. The mortar, which required a smaller security element than an artillery base and could be supported by the Huey, was established in a temporary mini-base located on the periphery of regular artillery range to extend indirect fire in support of ground troops. This became increasingly important as the number of squad and platoon-size operations increased.
After the Cambodian Campaign, it became the rule rather than the exception to conduct small unit operations down to separate squad and platoon-size forces, rather than the multi-battalion operations of previous years. In this way the Cavalry could cover a larger area more thoroughly, but this method of operation brought with it the requirement for a high caliber of leadership at the lowest level. The young Cavalry lieutenants and sergeants more than adequately proved they were up to the job. These small unit operations were enhanced by the inherent capability of the division to reinforce rapidly and the great flexibility and variety of firepower at its disposal.
As an example of the firepower available at this time, the standard armament of the Cobra now included the 2.75-inch rocket with a 17 pound warhead, the very effective 2.75-inch Flechette rocket, and the SX-35 20-mm cannon. The firepower of the division was enhanced by the intelligence gathering capability of the Seismic Intrusion Devices which were dropped by UH-1H helicopters along known infiltration routes. Once enemy movement had been detected, a small unit was lifted into an area well ahead of the enemy's determined course of movement and established an effective ambush with artillery and gunships standing by.
Into Laos
The final airmobile operation to be included in this study was given the code name of LAMSON 719. This combined operation took place in Laos from 8 February to 9 April 1971. LAMSON 719 was