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[Gen]eral Michael S. Davison, Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, to prepare plans for a coordinated attack to neutralize the Central Office South Vietnam base area in the "Fishhook" of Cambodia. He was told that the 1st Cavalry should be prepared to implement this operation within 72 hours of notification.

This operation, here referred to as the "Cambodian Campaign," was officially entitled "Operation TOAN THANG 43, TOAN THANG 45, and TOAN THANG 46." It did not include the Army of the Republic of Vietnam operations in the area of the "Parrot's Beak" to the south which were concurrent and continued after the operations of the 1st Cavalry Division.

During the period 26 to 28 April, the 1st Cavalry Division and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Division conducted joint planning for the operation. The major consideration at that time was the allocation of sufficient forces to insure successful accomplishment of the mission while continuing to conduct tactical operations within the III Corps Tactical Zone. The Allied forces that were to be used for the Cambodian Campaign were then deployed against the northern tier of III Corps Tactical Zone. The 1st Brigade of the 1st Cavalry was deployed in the far western War Zone "C"; the 3d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Brigade was in central War Zone "C"; and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry, were in the eastern portion. The 9th Regiment, 5th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division was operating in Binh Long Province with the 2d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Brigade to their east. The 2d Brigade of the Cavalry was in Phuoc Long Province. The Division Artillery Commander was responsible for the defense of a large sector centering on the division headquarters at Camp Gorvad.

Essentially, an attack into Cambodia meant little change in the operations of the 1st Cavalry. The Division had been moving progressively up to the border and expanding its interdiction operations both to the east and the west. Small hasty fire bases, each established only for a few days, had become the method of operation. Company and platoon-size airmobile units fanned out through wide areas of jungle and forest, traveling light, receiving resupply only once every three days. Since the division was already concentrating on fast-moving, light operations, leap-frogging them from one small hasty fire base to the ext, the order for the Cambodian campaign simply told it to do more of the same.

On 28 April, the Division was further directed to be prepared to commence operations within 48 hours of notification. It had