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[deter]mined enemy than the Viet Cong main force units. During heavy contact with this enemy battalion in Operation DAN CHI 157, the 13th Aviation Battalion won the Presidential Unit Citation.
During 1965 and 1966 the three Army of the Republic of Vietnam divisions chipped away at the Viet Cong strength until they were able to reduce the size of their airmobile operations to company size units because of the lessening threat. The 21st Division, in particular, commanded by Colonel (later Major General) Nguyen Van Minh, was aggressive and imaginative in pursuing the hard core Viet Cong. Colonel Minh and Colonel Robert B. Spilman, who was the 21st Division Senior Advisor, were largely responsible for building up the enviable record of the 21st Division.
The helicopter gunship became the one weapons system that could respond to the farflung outposts in a few moments notice day or night. The Vietnamese depended very heavily on gunship support and to a lesser extent on tube artillery. Operations in the Delta usually utilized three 5-helicopter gun platoons in the assault. One platoon would prepare a landing zone; a second platoon would accompany the lift ships into the landing zones; and the third platoon came in behind the lift ships to take over responsibility for fire support. Two officers of the 13th Aviation Battalion—Major Robert F. Molinelli and Captain Robin K. Miller—were singled out for official and unofficial recognition. Both of these individuals had made major contributions to gunship tactics in the Delta.
Major Molinelli and Captain Miller would be honored by being selected at different times by the Army Aviation Association as "Aviator of the Year." Space will not permit a full account of their accomplishments nor even a mention of the many other splendid young men who served in the Delta—especially, those brave soldiers who manned the lonely rearm and refuel points for months on end. However, they formed the backbone of the major airmobility innovation in the Delta—the dedicated task force concept.
Colonel Maddox, in explaining his rationale for forming task forces, remarked:
...I have never agreed with blade time allocations at the lower levels of command; I have never believed in maintaining release times; I have never believed that an individual who supports should be overly concerned with the specific command relationship he has with the supported force... I found under the task force concept that the supported division actually became a proponent for his aviation support. Senior advisors and division commanders bragged to me that they had released assets early so that the aircraft could go home for daylight maintenance. I found in general that the relationships became very close and the level of support became much higher... We found