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Emphasis on the word "Vietnamization" after 1968 has tended to hide the fact that there was a great deal of mutual cooperation, training, and planning all along. In literally hundreds of specific areas, we had already long ago agreed that the Vietnamese should have full control of operations; and, in the Delta, which we will review in this chapter, it had always been the modus operandi. Notwithstanding, we saw the need to do much more. The U.S. Army increased existing programs to train the South Vietnamese in all aspects of airmobility including pilot and crew instruction, joint operations, in many cases from collocated U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam division and brigade bases, and joint logistics. The operation into Cambodia in 1970 was an extremely successful example of what we could do together. The outstanding actions of all Army of the Republic of Vietnam units involved showed us that we were on solid ground in phasing our responsibilities over to the South Vietnamese. This was followed by a successful return to the same area the following year and by an incursion into Laos—LAMSON 719—in which Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces took on the very best that the North Vietnamese could muster and came out on top. This phase has been marked by the best spirit and mutual cooperation that the war has yet seen and by a dramatic tightening of the airmobile capabilities of Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces.

Earlier in this volume we touched on U.S. operations in the Delta region, but our examination of airmobility in Vietnam would be incomplete without mentioning the extraordinary accomplishments of our Army aviation units who for many years had been