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[How]ever, he and Lieutenant Colonel Guinn E. Unger, the Division G-4, made up provisional teams that proved invaluable. The Saigon Support Command provided a liaison team at Phuoc Vinh with established special telephone circuits which became essential.
Theater support from all Services was timely and effective. General Irby was later to recall:
The 1st Aviation Brigade did an outstanding job. They set up refueling, over-night stops, and food stations enroute. Our people could stop and get a rest break and something to eat and spare parts if they needed them... The Air Force and Navy were very responsive on the move. We coordinated on a minute-by-minute basis on the availability of C-130's, and the departure airfield control by the Air Force was outstanding.
General Forsythe summarized Operation LIBERTY CANYON as follows:
From northern I CTZ to the jungle frontier areas of northwestern III CTZ, the Division moved and deployed to interdict the movement of four enemy divisions as they attempted to move southward for an attack on the heartland of South Vietnam. The move was completed with great speed— (the first unit was in combat in III CTZ within 48 hours after it was alerted to move, and the Division was closed in 12 days) —and with strategic surprise (the enemy was confronted suddenly with a major force air assaulted astride his avenues of approach and into his prepared base areas with no prior warning). During the first nine days of the twelve day move, one brigade concurrently conducted and completed a major combat operation in northern I CTZ to penetrate the My Chanh Valley VC base area. In III CTZ the Division was given an immense area of operations (4,800 square miles); was based where existing space and facilities could be found (occupying 9 bases for our aircraft fleet); was given broad mission-type orders ("constitute the II FFV covering force"); and was given wide latitude and freedom of action to maneuver. In addition, care was taken not to fragment the Division or its assets, to permit the full range of its power, to find the enemy and to be shifted to fight him wherever he was found. It was proven beyond doubt that the total power of an airmobile division is greater than the sum of its parts. In short, we were given the opportunity to test the "theory of design and concept" of the airmobile division and we found it to be sound and practical.