Page:Airmobility 1961-1971.pdf/227

While these meetings were taking place in III Corps Tactical Zone, similar meetings were taking place in I Corps Tactical Zone at Headquarters III Marine Amphibious Force. Here it was determined that three LST's would be available for loading at Tan My on 28 October and two LST's available each day thereafter until completion of the move. The aircraft carrier Princeton was made available to move aircraft and equipment from the Da Nang area. Transportation was set up to haul organizational equipment from division unit locations at landing zone BETTY-SHARON, landing zone NANCY, and Camp Evans to loading facilities at Tan My Ramp, Quang Tri Airfield, and Phu Bai Airfield.

All the units of the division had contingency plans for air movement but these had to be modified on the spot to separate what was to be moved by air and what would be moved by sea. At Camp Evans, General Irby, Assistant Division Commander Alpha, directed that ¼-ton vehicles and smaller equipment would go by air with the troops, along with their individual combat gear, radios, and small arms. Selected larger pieces of equipment were approved for air movement on an individual basis. All other equipment was to move by sea. The aerial ports of departure were Camp Evans, Quang Tri, and Phu Bai.

On 29 October the Division completed and published an air movement plan which served as a guide as to when units would depart and the number of aircraft needed at origin and the destination of these aircraft. Due to the changes in the units stationing plan in III Corps Tactical Zone, it was necessary to make daily adjustments to this planned program. (The changes in the stationing plan were the result of later revised intelligence which caused General Forsythe to reorient some combat maneuver and aircraft assault units.) Even with these numerous changes, there was no case of an aircraft being on the ground available for loading without a load ready to be put aboard. As it turned out, aircraft loads were positioned well in advance of actual aircraft arrivals.

Units of the Division did not have definitive sea movement plans although they had made a sea movement into I Corps Tactical Zone just nine months earlier, utilizing eleven vessels. However, since that time, the Division had received a significant amount of additional equipment which made the previous sea movement experience invalid. The Division was offered initially more sea movement assets than it was capable of utilizing. Experience quickly indicated that the amount of regular incoming cargo, which was already back-logged on the ramps at Tan My, made it possible to pre-position only two LST loads without choking the