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[sup]porting fires were available throughout the operation, with only two fire support missions were necessary. As an indication of the restraint placed on the destructive power available, only two civilians were wounded and three huts destroyed during the entire operation.

The success of Operation VINH LOC was due to its detailed planning and coordination and the full utilization of all resources available—airmobile, naval, and ground. The establishment of the combined command post made possible the immediate flow of information between intelligence, operations, and fire support elements. The integration of the Popular Force platoons and the police forces into the U.S. units overcame the language barrier and permitted rapid distinction between civilians and enemy forces. Most importantly, the island was not left in a vacuum when the operation was over. One U.S. rifle company and an Army of the Republic of Vietnam battalion remained on the island to assist in the resettlement of the population, and to aid district forces in maintaining a secure atmosphere. Self-defense cadre were trained at district level, and rural development teams were inserted to assist in the re-establishment of local government, and to help the people improve health and sanitation measures, as well as agricultural methods. Operation VINH LOC, although modest in size, had shown how the United States and Republic of Vietnam forces could enhance their individual capabilities through mutual planning, coordination, and cooperation.

One of the more difficult military tasks is to move a division in contact with the enemy to another area of a combat theater, reposition it quickly, and have it ready to fight. In Vietnam where there were never any front lines nor truly secure rear areas, such a move had special problems. Operation LIBERTY CANYON, which was the code name given to the move of the 1st Cavalry Division from I Corps Tactical Zone to III Corps Tactical Zone in the fall of 1968, is one of the best examples of rapidly moving an entire division—a move that was made so professionally and smoothy that it even achieved strategic and tactical surprise to a knowledgeable enemy. The 1st Cavalry Division had become the world's acknowledged expert at pulling up stakes.

General Forsythe received a phone call on the night of 26 October 1968 alerting him that his division would move as quickly as possible by air and sea to the III Corps Tactical Zone and take