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the division was fragmented it reduced the flexibility of the division as a whole and proportionately reduced the true capabilities of the smaller forces. This is not to stay that the airmobile division cannot be used as the "fire brigade" for a theater commander; however, like the air cavalry squadron, its total effectiveness can only be realized as an entity.
My fourth observation was the constant need to be alert to the over-utilization of rotary wing aircraft in the supply mission. While I was the commander, I emphasized that our planning must always include provisions for utilizing the Caribou, C-123, and C-130 aircraft whenever they could enhance our capabilities. I knew of no instance during my tour in Vietnam when the 1st Cavalry Division was denied this fixed-wing support when it was requested. There were occasions when the division staff failed to plan for these aircraft and took the easy way out by going ahead and using our organic Chinooks for long logistics hauls. Operation PEGASUS was a good example of careful planning for the maximum use of the fixed-wing capabilities in the operational area. It would have been impossible to move the tonnages required in the time necessary without the careful preparation of landing zone STUD as a forward fixed-wing base.
As a fifth observation, I expressed my disappointment in one item of equipment, the Mohawk. From the Division's point of view, and I emphasized division, the six organic Mohwaks did not provide the expected intelligence. We made a sincere and continuous effort to use the Mohawk's side-looking airborne radar capability and the infra-red capability, but the end product never justified the man-hours and assets required. I was particularly disappointed in these results, because I had spent so much effort as Deputy Director and later as Director of Army Aviation in justifying this system. In the early years we had made a big point of the necessity of having this capability at the division level. We had hoped that the division commander would have a "real-time" read out of valuable information through a data link. After fifteen months, I had to conclude that the Mohawk should be employed at corps and theater level.
Finally, no summary of my experience with the 1st Cavalry Division would be complete without mentioning once again the "man" part of the "man-machine" equation of airmobility. During this period, I was particularly fortunate to have a series of outstanding officers and warrant officers. Space has not permitted mentioning even a small percentage of their names. But, equally important, the 1st Cavalry Division was blessed with a continuous