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U.S. Army, Vietnam, in the early planning for the move to I Corps Tactical Zone, finally recognized our obvious requirement, and included a more decentralized maintenance concept as part of their logistical plan. I've already mentioned how fortunate we were to have started our logistical bases at Red Beach and Hue-Phu Bai prior to the Tet Offensive. When the 1st Brigade went to Quang Tri, they had their maintenance with them. We had finally broken down the "golf course" syndrome which was associated with An Khe.

When the 101st was ordered to an airmobile configuration, my staff and I completely supported its concept of decentralized maintenance. The major portion of the tremendous responsibility for converting the 101st to its new configuration would soon be in the very capable hands of Major General Melvin Zais. He would receive the unqualified cooperation of every aviation commander in this effort.

On 15 July 1968 I turned over temporary command of the 1st Cavalry Division to Brigadier General Richard L. Irby. Major General George I. Forsythe had already been announced as the new Division Commanding General and would formally take command on 19 August, after completing flight training. After fifteen months of combat, several points stood out in my mind as particularly significant to the airmobility concept.

First, the vulnerability of the helicopter was still the most debatable issue in the entire military establishment. Depending on one's preconceived notions, one could use the same statistics to prove opposite viewpoints. For example, during calendar year 1967 the 1st Cavalry had flown 977,983 sorties and had 688 aircraft hit. Of these, 36 were shot down and lost. In the first six months of 1968, the Division had flown 407,806 sorties and had had 271 aircraft hit. Of these, 66 were shot down and lost. Part of this difference could be attributed to the increased intensity of combat in the northern I Corps Tactical Zone where the Division had been fighting since January; part could be attributed to the improvement in the quantity and quality of the North Vietnamese Army antiaircraft weapons systems; but, much of this so-called "increased vulnerability" was due to the thousands of random and sometimes uncontrolled flights by one or two aircraft performing separate observation, administrative, and control missions. In other words, I do not believe that we had a major increase in our losses in our