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helicopter weapon might be the armed Cobra. The Air Force continued to press for drastic measures to cope with the threat.

A meeting was held at III Marine Amphibious Force on 18 June to discuss the Services positions and problems in this matter. The Marines and the Army took similar positions, basically that stated previously by General Williams. The Air Force cited one of their problems was that of identifying the low slow-flying aircraft.

As time passed and further investigations were conducted, it developed that no finite evidence was available to confirm that enemy helicopters had been observed, in flight, on the ground, or in a damaged state following claims of destruction by friendly air. The previously accepted positive reports were discredited.

My purpose in relating this incident is not to criticize any Service or persons involved, but to highlight the lack of prior planning in this most important area. The U.S. forces had enjoyed complete air superiority for so many years in Vietnam that the mere possibility of the presence of even an enemy helicopter threw all of their operational procedures into chaos. The Air Force reaction to a possible enemy air threat was predictable and, in their estimation, the only realistic option at that time. The Air Force reaction to a possible enemy air threat was predictable and, in their estimation, the only realistic option at that time. The Army and the Marine ground elements, which depended on the unlimited use of the helicopters, naturally could not accept the rigid restrictions that the Air Force insisted was necessary. The incident did not have a positive effect of clarifying the command channels and some sober planning on means and methods to better react to future enemy air contingencies. It is an incident that should not be forgotten by the future planners of airmobility in any conflict where absolute air superiority is not a basic assumption.

On 28 June 1968 U.S. Army, Pacific published General Order 325 which initiated reorganization of the 101st Airborne Division into the Army's second airmobile division. This same order called for the Division to be redesignated the 101st Air Cavalry Division effective 1 July 1968.^[1]