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At 2055 hours on 16 June a U.S. radar station reported that ten unidentified helicopters had been located six kilometers north of the Ben Hai River. During the remainder of the night of 16-17 June 1968 numerous reports were received of enemy helicopters operating in the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone. Another report cited an attack on a U.S. Navy boat by an unidentified aircraft. Finally, it was reported that many of the enemy helicopters were destroyed by U.S. Air Force aircraft and by artillery. Two hours after the first report had been received, 7th Air Force dispatched a message stating that all aircraft, both helicopter and fixed-wing, operating in the I Corps Tactical Zone would be under the positive control of Air Force ground radar stations. In effect, this Air Force message would have paralyzed all ground operations in this area.

General Williams, Commanding General of the 1st Aviation Brigade, visited 7th Air Force Headquarters early on the morning of 17 June to inform the Chief of Staff of the 7th Air Force that compliance with the Air Force teletypewriter exchange was impractical since it would cut off not only tactical operations but also emergency resupply and medical evacuation flights in I Corps Tactical Zone. He pointed out that the 7th Air Force did not have a control means to handle even a fraction of the 1,000 Army aircraft that were in I Corps and that the 7th Air Force message itself was not valid since that headquarters was not in the U.S. Army, Vietnam, command channel. There is no record of III Marine Amphibious Force receiving the message or, if received, any objection to the message. At 1100 on 17 June the Chief of Staff of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, informed the Chief of Staff of the 7th Air Force that Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, had not even been an information addressee on the message; that the message was impractical since it would stop combat operations; that it was not within the prerogative of the 7th Air Force to send; and that it would be rescinded.

Colonel Eugene M. Lynch, Deputy Aviation Officer, U.S. Army, Vietnam, attended a meeting at 7th Air Force Headquarters that same day to discuss this problem. The Air Force considered the helicopter sightings a serious threat to Da Nang Air Base and all other major installations in the I Corps Tactical Zone. Colonel Lynch emphasized the points that had been made previously... that combat operations could not be stopped entirely and that the Army installations were quite capable of defending themselves against enemy helicopters. He suggested that the best anti-enemy