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viewed as the warp of new tactics and techniques with organic aviation providing the woof of skills and technology to make the whole cloth.

The airmobility concept was not a product of Vietnam expediency. It would probably not be practical to make a record of every decision which formed a part of the airmobile concept. It certainly had its roots in both the airborne techniques of World War II and the early doctrine for organic aviation for ground forces for that era. However, from a practical viewpoint, the embryonic decision can be said to be the Army's move to form twelve helicopter battalions on 21 August 1952. This key decision was made to commit the Army to airmobility even though a practical troop-carrying helicopter was still unproven and the helicopter tactics and techniques existed only in the minds of a handful of men. Though the twelve battalion goal was overly optimistic at that time, it dramatized how the impact of Korean experience had influenced Army planners.

In Korea the Army had learned that the difficult terrain in that land mass and the numerical superiority of the enemy combined to provide the communist with an advantage that was not easily balanced by the qualitative superiority of the American soldier and his supporting firepower. Many thoughtful officers had watched the little observation helicopter—turned ambulance—flit up and down the steep hills with effortless agility. It was not hard to envision the possibilities inherent in hundreds of larger machines carrying combat troops up and over those deadly slopes. The Marines had already demonstrated the possibility for a small unit being carried into combat and the helicopter itself was beginning to mature, with more power and more dependability.

After Korea many senior commanders restudied the lessons of that war and compared actual campaign operations with hypothetical airmobile operations under the same conditions. Various Army aviators and members of the helicopter industry were keeping a close watch on the French and British helicopter squadrons and Algeria and Malaysia.

The mid-fifties were gestation years for new tactics and technology. Major General James M. Gavin's article in Harper's magazine (April 1954) "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses!" was indicative of the sort of vision some enthusiasts had for the future. The article was an unofficial summation of several staff studies prepared in his office while he was G-3, Department of the Army. During this period I was General Gavin's Director of Doctrine and Combat Development, and through his Deputy, Major General