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down during the day, thus leading to a situation where if he could be found, he could be dealt with fairly readily. Another factor that affected our approach was that the 9th was rather off at the end of the line, and its location, plus its low priority, meant that it usually received a rather austere level of aircraft resources. These two factors combined led to a situation where you had to squeeze maximum results out of a relatively small number of aircraft. However, in late '68, the priority of Delta operations was raised, and the Division began to receive three lift companies and three air cav troops (including its own). We, therefore, found that we had a reasonable number of aircraft in a highly sympathetic environment and were used to getting the most out of our aircraft. This is all background to assure you that we don't make claims to "inventing the wheel" but were in a situation where we had to do what we did to stay alive.
The 9th Infantry Division made a study of its operations from March through August 1968 to analyze division operations with and without airmobile assets. They attempted to quantify the division's effectiveness by stripping out all the other variables with the exception of the addition of helicopter lift and the air cavalry. The study considered that the simplest and most relevant statistical index of combat effectiveness was the average number of Viet Cong losses inflicted daily by the unit in question. This criteria had to be adjusted to account for the fact that units do not engage in offensive field operations every day. This was especially true for the riverine units in the 2d Brigade, 9th Division, which had to allow for extended period for boat maintenance. In their study, it was assumed that the provision of all types of airmobile resources except the assault helicopter units and air cavalry units was uniform and thus did not materially influence combat effectiveness from day to day.
A total of 313 brigade-days were analyzed. With no airmobiity or air cavalry support the 3d Brigade of the 9th Division averaged 0.21 significant enemy contacts per day spent on field operations. However, when supported by an assault helicopter company and an air cavalry troop, brigade performance more than doubled. In other words, with no air assets a brigade made significant contact with the enemy only once every five days; with airmobile assets, it developed contact every other day.
An analysis of the Viet Cong losses per field day produced more definitive inferences. With no air assets, the brigade performance averaged 1.6 Viet Cong losses per field day—hardly a creditable return. However, when a brigade was supported by an air cavalry troop and a helicopter company, the brigade performance rose to 13.6 Viet Cong per day—an increase of 850 percent. The study went on to refine its perimeters, but the conclusion was inescap[able]