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troops, supported by armor, overran the camp. Early on the 10th a helicopter from A Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, had located a PT-76 tank and had called in a tactical air strike on the vehicle. The tank was destroyed along with fifteen enemy troops.

Though this was the only recorded tank kill during Operation PEGASUS, we had had intelligence of enemy armor throughout this area. The enemy's offensive at Lang Vei Special Forces Camp had given undeniable proof of this enemy capability and, since that time, intelligence sources estimated a possible company-size armor unit near Khe Sanh. The 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry had sighted tank treads several times in their early reconnaissance before D-day.

Before the operation I had directed the division to be prepared to use the SS-11 missile system during PEGASUS. This system, which employed a wire-guided armor-piercing missile had been in the theater since the arrival of the 1st Cavalry. However, the lack of lucrative targets had reduced its usefulness. The system had been standardized in the U.S. Army since 1960 when it replaced the lighter French SS-10 missile. Since then hundreds of gunners had been trained at Fort Rucker, Alabama, in the use of the SS-11. We were never able to target this system during PEGASUS, but I still felt it was a very valuable capability that should be maintained in constant readiness.

Highway Nine into the Khe Sanh Combat Base was officially opened on 11 April after the Marine engineers had worked day and night to complete their task. In eleven days the engineers had reconstructed over fourteen kilometers of road, repaired or replaced nine bridges, and constructed seventeen bypasses. Numerous sections of the road had to be cleared of landslides and craters.

I had scheduled more than 38 additional operations to extend our control of the Khe Sanh area but, without warning, on the morning of 10 April I received orders from General Rosson to make plans to extract the Division as soon as possible to prepare for an assault into the A Shau Valley. Advance units started pulling out on the 11th. Limited operations continued until 15 April when Operation PEGASUS was officially terminated.

There was great potential for the continued air assault operations that were abruptly brought to close. The enemy as vulnerable; he was abandoning his equipment; and, he was completely disorganized. The decision to expedite our withdrawal immediately upon completing our primary mission—the relief of Khe Sanh Combat Base—was predicated on a long-range forecast which predicted April as the last possible time for air assault operations in the A Shau Valley before the heavy monsoon rains.