Page:Airmobility 1961-1971.pdf/190

supporting artillery. Both landing zones were secured and no significant enemy resistance was encountered. A batter of 105-mm howitzers was airlifted into each landing zone and Colonel Campbell moved his brigade headquarters into the northern landing zone, landing zone CATES. Bad weather notwithstanding, everything was in place prior to darkness. The major accomplishment of D-day was the professional manner in which this tremendously complex operation, with all its split-second timing and coordination, had to be delayed several hours yet was completed as planned.

The bad weather of D-day was to haunt the 1st Cavalry throughout Operation PEGASUS. Seldom were airmobile moves feasible much before 1300. "Good weather" was considered to be any condition when the ceiling was above 500 feet and slant range visibility was more than a mile and a half. The bad weather further proved the soundness of establishing landing zone STUD as the springboard for the assaults. Troops, ammo and supplies could be assembled there ready to go whenever the weather to the west opened up. Marshalling areas further away would have drastically deteriorated response time.

On D+1 (2 April), the 1st Marine Regiment continued its ground attack along the axis of Highway Nine. Two Marine companies made limited air assaults to support the Regiment's momentum. The 3d Brigade air assaulted the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry into a new position further to the west while the other two battalions improved their positions. The 2d Brigade under Colonel Joseph C. McDonough moved into marshalling areas in preparation for air assaults the next day, if called upon.

Lest all of this sound routine, I want to emphasize that only the initial assaults on D-day were fixed in time or place. All subsequent attacks were varied to meet changes in the enemy situation or to capitalize on unexpected progress. As an example, I ordered an acceleration of the tempo when the results of D-day attacks gave clear evidence that the enemy was unprepared.

Our initial thrusts had met less enemy resistance than expected. As a consequence, the 2d Brigade was thrown into the attack a day earlier than the original schedule with three battalions^[1] moving into two new areas south and west of our earlier landing zones.