Page:Airmobility 1961-1971.pdf/188
aerial observation and daily photographic coverage, General Westmoreland had personally made the decision to divert new acoustic sensors from their intended implacement along the DMZ to the approaches around Khe Sanh. Through a complex computer system, these devices could provide early warning of any intrusion and were often used to target B-52 strikes. However, the acoustical sensor system, which was focused on the immediate area of Khe Sanh, did not directly help develop the complete intelligence picture necessary for our proposed attack along Highway Nine.
The actual intelligence on the enemy in the area was very vague and expressed in generalities. The 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry operated from landing zone STUD in gradually increasing concentric circles up to the Khe Sanh area, working all the time with air cover from the 7th Air Force or the 1st Marine Air Wing. The Cavalry Squadron was almost the only means available to pinpoint enemy locations, antiaircraft positions, and strong points that the division would try to avoid in the initial assaults. The squadron was also responsible for the selection of critical landing zones. Their information proved to be timely and accurate.
During the initial surveillance efforts it became evident that the enemy had established positions designed to delay or stop any attempt to reinforce or relieve Khe Sanh. Positions were identified on key terrain features both north and south of Highway Nine. As part of the reconnaissance by fire, known or suspected enemy antiaircraft positions and troop concentrations were sought out and destroyed either by organic fire or tactical air. Landing zones were selected and preparations of the landing zones for future use were accomplished by tactical air using specially fused bombs and B-52 Arc Light strikes. During this phase of the operation, the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry developed targets for 632 sorties of tactical air, 49 sorties for the specially fused bombs, and twelve B-52 Arc Light strikes. The thoroughness of the battlefield preparation was demonstrated during the initial assaults of the 1st Cavalry Division, for no aircraft were lost due to antiaircraft fire or enemy artillery.
At this point, I must mention the element of surprise. Certainly the enemy knew we were in the area. Our own reporters let the whole world know the situation as they saw it, and the arm-chair strategist could ponder the problem each evening in front of his color TV. However, the inherent capabilities of the airmobile division presented the enemy with a bewildering number of possible thrusts that he would have to counter, all the way to the Laotian