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MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1968
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by withering artillery, rocket and mortar fire and probing efforts against outlying defensive positions to the north and northwest. South of the base the enemy attempted to overrun the villages of Khe Sanh and Huong Hoa, but were beaten back by Marine and South Vietnamese defenders. In this initial action, enemy fire destroyed virtually all of the base ammunition stock as well as a substantial portion of the fuel supplies. In addition, the all-important air strip was severely damaged forcing a temporary suspension of flights into the area.

From these beginnings, the battle lines at Khe Sanh were tightly drawn around the main base and its adjacent mountain strongholds. For the next 66 days world-wide attention would remain riveted on Khe Sanh where the enemy seemed to be challenging the United States to a set battle on a scale not attempted since the great communist victory at Dien Bien Phu.

As the siege of Khe Sanh progressed, air delivered fire support reached unprecedented levels. A daily average of 45 B-52 sorties and 300 tactical air sorties by Air Force and Marine aircraft were flown against targets in the vicinity of the base. The U.S. Navy provided additional aircraft sorties from carriers. Eighteen hundred tons of ordnance a day were dumped into the area laying waste to huge swaths of jungle terrain and causing hundreds of secondary explosions. In seventy days of air operations 96,000 tons of bombs were dropped, nearly twice as much as was delivered by the Army Air Force in the Pacific during 1942 and 1943. B-52 Arc Light strikes were particularly effective against enemy personnel and had a great psychological impact on their troops.

Artillery fire provided an important supplement to the air campaign. The sixteen 175-mm guns at Camp Carroll and the "Rock Pile" as well as the forty odd artillery pieces positioned inside the Khe Sanh perimeter directed some 118,000 rounds at enemy positions within a ten mile radius of the base.

But even though the allies were successful in keeping Khe Sanh supplied by air and surrounding its defenders with a pulverizing wall of firepower, a deep feeling of apprehension over the fate of this outpost persisted in official and public circles. After all, the base was completely encircled by an enemy with at least a three to one numerical advantage, and that enemy unmistakably commanded the initiative. Much of the high ground overlooking Khe Sanh was undefended and presumably came under the control of the North Vietnamese. Despite intensive counter fires the enemy managed to regularly pound the life-supporting runway and other critical installations with mixed barrages of artillery, rocket, and