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TET, 1968
153


have covered the area. A typical month, October 1967, showed two battalion-size assaults, 110 company and and 165 platoon-size assaults. As a matter of fact, the Division was just about as "busy," from an airmobile viewpoint, as it would ever be.

Statistics on relative vulnerability show that out of 1,147 sorties one aircraft would be hit by enemy fire, one aircraft was shot down per 13,461 sorties, and only one aircraft was shot down and lost per 21,194 sorties. Used properly the helicopter was not the fragile target some doom-forecasters had predicted.

While the two major battles of Operation PERSHING were continuing, the 1st Cavalry Division was the source of "fire brigades" for many other operations in the western and northern provinces of Vietnam. Some of these have been mentioned earlier. On 4 May 1967, the division boundary had actually been moved further north to include a portion of the Nui Sang Mountain and the Nuoc Dinh Valley in I Corps Tactical Zone. Elements of the division had conducted operations in that general area, particularly the A Lao Valley, throughout the remainder of Operation PERSHING.

The words of my third Chief of Staff, Colonel Conrad L. Stansberry, in summing up the after action report of Operation PERSHING bear repeating:

Operation PERSHING was the largest single operation and the most successful in which the 1st Air Cavalry Division has participated since its arrival in Vietnam in August 1965. While it is difficult to measure fully the degree of success achieved in the many facets of the war in Binh Dinh Province, significant damage was inflicted on the enemy in loss of lives and combat assets. In addition, many gaps in the VC infrastructure were created over a period of time which made operations in the coastal plains area more difficult for him to execute. The local population was made aware of the Free World presence and the ability to continuously defeat and harass the enemy.

There are several reasons why the Division was able to accomplish this. Part of the answer lies in the ability to hop, skip, and jump over the entire AO in short notice; part lies in the close relationship between the 1st Cav Div and the 22d ARVN Div, CRID and other military and paramilitary forces operating in the area; part lies in the fact that the Division operated for a long period of time in the AO and became thoroughly familiar with the terrain and general atmosphere of the area; and part lies in the exploitation of the NPFF in separating the VC infrastructure from the people.

The Air Cavalry Division also has hidden attributes which are not apparent from organization charts, methods of operation, etc., that contributed significantly to the success of Operation PERSHING. Frequent air assaults over the battlefield maintains the "spirit of the offensive" in 1st Cav soldiers and causes them to live with the high degree of flexibility that promotes a "can do" attitude. In addition, the Air