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[tac]tics which he used to avoid the heavier fires from our tactical air support and B-52 bombers.

The Army had long realized that the Huey-gun-rocket combination was a make-shift, albeit, quite ingenious, system that should be replaced by a new aircraft specifically designed for the armed mission. In the early 1960's, industry asserted that advance was within the state of the art. Experts in research and development urged the Army planners to go for a compound helicopter with an integrated armament system as soon as possible. They argued that it was technically feasible and procurement of any "interim" system would mean the Army would be stuck with an inferior capability for years to come. Moreover, it appeared that an advanced system could be procured almost as soon as an interim aircraft.

There were other pressures too. The Office of the Secretary of Defense had been critical of all the Services in their efforts to procure expensive weapons systems that appeared to offer only marginal improvements over the system they were to replace—aircraft that flew a little higher or faster, tanks that had only slightly better performance, ships that cruised but a few knots faster. Ever since the Howze Board, the Army was sensitive to any criticism that it was striving for less than the best in airmobility. Also, the Air Force maintained that much of Army aviation duplicated an Air Force capability rather than, as the Army claimed, complemented Air Force support. The Army decided that its best option was to hold a design competition for a totally new system that would offer unique capabilities.

Unfortunately, what was a straight forward concept for a new armed helicopter soon became bogged down in a morass of permutations, modifications and additions to its design. The technicians had taken over from the tacticians. The concept grew in complexity and cost. Worse, it was being pushed into a later time frame when it was sorely needed in combat. Such things as a rigid rotor, ground avoidance radar, inertial navigation and computerization were straining the state of the art and pricing the Army out of mass production. A reevaluation was inevitable.

Bell Helicopter Company had prudently carried on its own research and development program using proven dynamic components of the Huey. Consequently, they were able to offer, at the appropriate moment, an "off-the-shelf" armed helicopter for just slightly more than the modified UH-1 that the Army was then buying to replace Vietnam attrition. The "Cobra" had enough speed to meet the escort mission; tandem seating; better armor;