Page:Airmobility 1961-1971.pdf/155

only 34 troopers killed in action while 849 enemy were killed and 109 captured. More important than enemy losses, the Task Force had enabled the South Vietnamese government to spread its control from the province and district capitals to virtually all the population in the area. Agriculture production, commerce, education and medical treatment had increased manyfold.

The small but vitally important air assaults of Operation BYRD not only reproduced the Binh Dinh battle in miniature; they also underscored the significant advantages of envelopment over penetration as a tactic. Penetration is costly—opening a gap, widening it, and holding the shoulders in order to get into the enemy's rear. The air assault concept permits a cheaper, faster, and more decisive vertical envelopment approach, which has made the conventional battlefield more fluid than ever. The great variety of air assault concepts seems to fall under two major headings—each of which is a principle of war—surprise and security. In the Battle of Binh Dinh as well as in Operation BYRD, extensive preparations or detailed reconnaissance, while maximizing security, compromised surprise and often created dry holes. Executing air assaults without prior artillery preparation and with limited prior reconnaissance involved considerable risk, but frequently yielded rewarding results. The choice depends on the enemy situation and the ability of the G-2 to present the proper recommendation to the division commander. The air assault must rely on speed, scheme of maneuver, locally available firepower (aerial rocket artillery, and command and control from an aerial platform. Additionally, a reinforcing capability to exploit success or to assault the enemy from another direction must be immediately available to the commander.

This period in the BYRD fighting was characterized by almost daily contacts with squad and platoon-size Viet Cong elements as the task force searched base areas and interdicted lines of communication. Combined United States and South Vietnamese operations were continuous, with both sides gaining mutual respect and experience.

In August 1967 the 1st Cavalry Division again moved into Quang Ngai Province in I Corps Tactical Zone with three battalions under the 3d Brigade, commanded by Colonel McKenna. This resulted in the first major reconnaissance in force into the