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it had a well-developed infrastructure from the sea coast as far inland as Ba To. The legitimate government of Vietnam controlled at most 10 percent of the land in the district and, in essence, was powerless in the area.

On 28 January, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, part of Task Force X-RAY,^[1] had moved from its base at Chu Lai into the Duc Pho area to alleviate some of the enemy control in that district. The Marines concentrated their operations around the city of Duc Pho itself, for the Marine battalion had very little helicopter support and was, by and large, restricted to ground mobility. The only Marine reinforcement in this area had been in late February and early March when a special landing force of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines (from Okinawa) and the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (from Chu Lai) were engaged in a search and clear mission to the south of Duc Pho City. In early March these reinforcements returned to their home bases leaving the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines in place. The III Marine Amphibious Force had been receiving increasing pressure along the DMZ throughout the early months of 1967 and increased enemy infiltration had forced the Marines to commit the majority of their forces along this line. The Marines were thin on the DMZ and wanted to move Task Force X-RAY north from the southern part of their area of responsibility. The Marine plan included pulling out of Duc Pho as soon as Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, could provide a replacement force. General Westmoreland decided that the most responsive unit available would be the 1st Cavalry Division.

The 1st Cavalry Division was given less than twelve hours to put a battalion task force into the Duc Pho area and less than 36 hours to increase that force to brigade size. In deference to the Marines, the operation was named after Major General John Archer Lejeune, a Marine leader during the Spanish American War and World War I. Most of the landing zones also were given names from Marine Corps history.

When the orders to move were received on the night of 6 April, the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Stevenson, was chosen to begin the action since this battalion was in a preparatory posture at An Khe for another operation. At 0115 hours on the 7th, approximately three hours after the Division had received the oral order, the 11th Aviation