Page:Airmobility 1961-1971.pdf/144

wasn't time to adequately police the drop zone. Also there were some problems on Tactical Air coordination. Long delays were imposed prior to a tactical air strike by the communications and coordination required between the large number of units involved. While safety was of prime consideration, there were periods of time when no ordnance was being delivered against the enemy. In addition, General Deane had noticed that air strikes were being called in when troops were unable to break contact, forcing the jets to break away without having an alternate target. However, the control and coordination procedures began to smooth out after the first few hours of confusion.

This combined operation, which the 173d Brigade had begun so dramatically, continued until mid-May. The enemy lost over 2,700 dead along with vast amounts of ammunition, medical supplies, and more than 800 tons of rice. War Zone C, which had been an exclusive Viet Cong stronghold for many areas, was now vulnerable to the allied forces at any time of their choosing. In retrospect, there is no question that the parachute assault which began JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE was effective. The troopers had been well trained and knew what to expect but, as General Deane stated, "More importantly, they did what was expected of them."

The employment of the airborne parachute force is historically visualized as a theater-controlled operation aimed at achieving strategic surprise. Although parachute delivery of troops and equipment is a relatively inefficient means of introduction into combat, the very existence of this capability complicates the enemy's planning and offers the friendly commander one more option of surprise. IN this instance, which involved multiple units in a major operation, there was a greater demand for helicopter lift than there were helicopter assets. As a result, the 173d pushed strongly for a parachute assault. The fact that airborne techniques were not used more often in Vietnam can be attributed to many factors.

The most obvious restraint to an airborne operation in Vietnam was the time lag inherent in airborne operations in responding to intelligence on the elusive enemy. The relatively unsuccessful French parachute operations already had pointed this out to us. A much more important restraint was the nature of the war itself and the limitations imposed on U.S. forces. From a strategic point of view, the U.S. posture in Vietnam was defensive. U.S. tactical offensive operations were limited to the confines of South Vietnam. Had the rules been changed, the parachute potential could have profitably been employed by planning an airborne assault into enemy territory at a distance within the ferry range of the Huey.