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incoming replacements, but coordinated directly with the Air Force troop carrier unit on aircraft, weight, and space available and loading and departure times.

At the other end of the pipeline, at Pleiku, Division personnel received and coordinated the further movement of replacement personnel to the division base at An Khe. Some of this movement was accomplished by convoy over Highway 19, but a significant part of the movement was made by air, as Air Force C-130 aircraft and the Division's Caribou (CV-2) aircraft were available. Although 11,000 miles long, stretching half-way around the world, the Division's replacement pipeline worked smoothly and effectively. Units were maintained at fighting strength, operations continued, and the Division moved through its transitional "changing of the guard."

This changeover not only included the loss of combat seasoned leaders, fighters, flyers, and supporters, but also witnessed the departure of those personnel who had been a part of the birth of the airmobile experience, had been with it through its early development and formative period, had tested it, and had applied the principles of airmobility to the nature of warfare in South Vietnam.

I have mentioned earlier that one cannot view the airmobile concept as a simple problem of moving men and equipment from point "A" to point "B." One of the fundamental reasons for the development of airmobility was the Army's concern that the balance between firepower and maneuver had swung too far in the direction of firepower. It was envisioned that the helicopter could right this balance. However, with this mobility, there was also danger that the soldier would outrun his supporting firepower if some means were not found to increase the mobility of the supporting weapons to the same degree. This is particularly true of artillery.

The U.S. infantryman over the years has come to expect and get continuous artillery support on call. The artilleryman in turn has depended on the infantry to secure his positions and keep his supply routes open. In Vietnam no simple solutions were available to continue this long-established teamwork. The early designers of the airmobile division had recognized that they would have to sacrifice the heavy 155-mm howitzers and be content with moving the 105-mm howitzer with the Chinook helicopter. As it turned out, a 155-mm howitzer battalion was continuously attacked to the 1st Cavalry. It was teamed with the CH-54 Crane to become an inte[gral]