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AIRMOBILE DEVELOPMENTS, 1966
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engineer teams found that chain saws were of little value in bamboo forests. Vines became easily entangled in the saws and the bamboo splinters caused many lacerations among the workers.

A corollary problem in the dense jungle was the evacuation of wounded. The Huey at this time had no suitable hoist which would allow a stretcher to be lifted at a hovering helicopter. The hoist of the Chinook was adequate, but too slow for personnel evacuation, and seldom would this helicopter be available for this mission. General Pearson recommended that improved winch systems for both the Huey and the Chinook be provided as soon as possible.

In the 101st operations in the highlands during this period, an airmobile company was placed in direct support of each infantry battalion and the same company habitually supported a specific battalion. The brigade found this arrangement was mutually advantageous; resulted in increased responsiveness; and enhanced the effectiveness of aviation support. By now the use of a command and control helicopter had become routine for each infantry battalion commander and he used this helicopter for liaison, communications relay with subordinate units, assisting units to pinpoint their locations, guiding units to terrain objectives, and locating potential landing zones.

Seldom mentioned in dispatches, the brigade had two fixed wing Beavers which handled a multitude of minor resupply and administrative missions for the brigade; and the old reliable fixed wing O-1 observation aircraft did yeoman service. These airplanes which were almost taken for granted because they required so little attention, relieved critical helicopter assets for vital tactical missions for which they would otherwise have not been available.


Airmobility and the U.S. "Presence"

With the arrival of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade on 14 August 1966, the total U.S. strength in Vietnam rose to approximately 300,000. More troops would soon follow. To some casual observers throughout the world, this seemed an inordinate number of military personnel to cope with an unsophisticated enemy in a relatively small country. Some people visualized a U.S. soldier on every other square yard of South Vietnamese soil. This simply is not so.

Map 3 is an outline map of South Vietnam superimposed over an outline map of the United States. You will note that when the northern border along the 17th Parallel is positioned near Pitts[burgh]