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to Saigon; or the differences between landing time after time in a pinnacle approach versus ordinary operations.
Althiugh regulations required two pilots per aircraft for each flight, some commanders found it necessary to relax this procedure for certain administrative flights. Consequently, many units began an unofficial training program whereby crew chiefs were given "stick" time and were coached in the rudiments of flying to the point where they could take over in case of an emergency and theoretically land the helicopter safely. This training paid off in isolated cases where the pilot and copilot were wounded and the crew chief brought the aircraft back. This informal training had an ancillary benefit in that it encouraged quite a few crew chiefs to apply for warrant officer flight training.
The shortage of pilots was only part of the personnel problem. Skilled mechanics, crew chiefs, avionics and armament specialists were in critical demand. The twelve month rotational policy (which General Westmoreland determined essential for the long range haul) generated special problems in what was known as the "hard skills." The enlisted student might spend a full year or more in developing proficiency in repairing radar or turbine engines, and then serve in Vietnam for a year or less before he had to be replaced by an equally skilled man. For the career soldier, there was a danger that he could become over-specialized in some particular skill required in Southeast Asia and consequently could not be utilized when he left. This led to morale and promotion problems. Many a skilled helicopter crew chief upon being reassigned to the United States or Europe found himself "technically unemployed" and wound up in an obscure motor pool where his special identity would get lost. Fortunately, many of these outstanding people were kept in the program and volunteered either to return to Vietnam for a successive tour or volunteered for flight training.
The performance of the crew chiefs and mechanics were summed up by one general this way:
The super performance did not stop with the pilots. The maintainers achieved the miraculous. High birds in the brigade were getting a 140 to 150 hours a month piled on them when they were programmed for only 70 and the average UH-1D was going over 100. This overflying was in direct conflict with the desired availability rate of 75 percent, but our maintenance detachments met both goals. Crew chiefs flew all day and worked on their birds all night. The sight around the average company maintenance detachment when the birds staggered home in the evenings was a sight to behold. The maintenance crews rolled out, turned on the lights, worked with flashlights, worked by feel, worked any way, in the rain, in high winds and dust storms, all