Page:Airmobility 1961-1971.pdf/124
[pro]vide the same degree of satisfaction in a situation where the Air Force felt that it had authority to override this commitment in order to provide high priority support of Air Force units.
The most frequent complaint received from Army users was the Air Force limitation on crew time. This limitation has in the past prevented completion of some missions. When the extent of the complaint became known to [Brigadier General Burl W. McLaughlin, Commanding General 834th Air Division], he immediately stated that this would be corrected internally in his command. This is a further indication of the current Air Force desire to provide highly satisfactory service.
You will note that the study provides justification for more aircraft and defines in fairly precise terms what a follow-on aircraft should be. The Army must take a firm position on the type of aircraft to be provided in the future if satisfactory service is to continue. Two popular trends in studies and statements of requirements may require considerable Army opposition. The first concerns a VTOL development. Required for the mission is a simple, rugged, easily maintained, dependable VTOL airplane which can be built within today's state-of-the-art (in fact, it exists in the deHaviland Buffalo). Efforts to provide VTOL can only result in either an aircraft that duplicates the helicopter by giving up speed, endurance and low cost, or an aircraft that is very expensive and complex with some severe operational limitations. The second trend relates to size. A comparatively small aircraft is required. The Air Force has always tended to build larger and more powerful aircraft. If the aircraft provided for this mission becomes too large, it will gravitate toward the Common Service Airlift System on the basis of obtaining efficient utilization of its greater lift capacity.
Many studies would follow by both the Air Force and the Army to prove the point, or disprove the point, that the Caribou were better, or worse, under Air Force control. The same arguments on combat effectiveness versus cost effectiveness would surface again, but the transfer of the Caribou must always remain a footnote to the Army's story of airmobility rather than a chapter by itself.
Army Aviation Personnel
During 1966, while I was Commandant of the Army Aviation School, the shortage of Army aviators became critical. This should not have come as a surprise since the Army planners had forecast this shortage for more than a year, but now the buildup of U.S. forces in Vietnam and the concurrent requirement for more airmobile assets made it apparent to commanders at every level.
As early as January 1966, Department of the Army had informed General Westmoreland that all aviator sources had been exhausted and nearly 500 Republic of Vietnam returnees would be needed for additional tours in Vietnam. One hundred and seventy-six of these has less than two years between tours and soon