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In the context of the times I find it quite easy to understand General Johnson's rationale for signing this controversial agreement. The Army's airmobility program was being threatened by inter-service bickering and budget limitations. There was a distinct possibility that, in the absence of some such agreement, an all-out battle on the very right of the Army to own any aircraft might have occurred. Furthermore, the Army Chief of Staff was a man of uncompromising integrity who had every confidence that both the word and the spirit of this agreement would be carried out by both Services. To their credit, both Services did bend over backwards to make sure that the transfer of the Caribou would be smoothly effected by 1 January 1967. The Aviation School set up special training programs for Air Force pilots and the Army Caribou pilots who were working themselves out of a job could not have been more diligent.
General Johnson closely followed the transfer of the Caribou and its subsequent effectiveness under Air Force management. He charged his staff to keep him informed of progress by frequent analyses. One such study, made after the Air Force had been operating the Caribou for a full year, showed a 12.4 percent increase in hours flown and a 11.4 percent increase in Caribou cargo tonnage. Incidentally, this same study showed a drastic rise in the utilization of the Chinook. Fundamentally, there was no real way to compare the Air Force operations versus the Army. By Air Force standards, Army aviation organizations were woefully under-manned and under-staffed; support and maintenance were accomplished entirely differently by the two Services; and the Air Force had consolidated the Caribou operations in three fixed bases. Much more basic from the ground commanders' viewpoint, the Air Force seemed unwilling to procure more Caribou or its successor—the Buffalo.
In this regard, Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr., Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army, Vietnam, on 21 April 1968, wrote General Johnson, the Chief of Staff, as follows:
...Although the Air Force has neither attached the C-7 units to Army supported units nor given the Army operational control, the responsiveness required has been achieved by what is termed dedicated service. At least this is a step in the right direction. However, dedicated service leaves the Air Force with a possible string on the aircraft and units. It will work under conditions such as in the case of our C-7 support where there is strong motivation for all elements of the Air Force to make it work and where there are no competing demands within the Air Force for use of the aircraft. In RVN only one C-7 is dedicated in support of the Air Force; this service provides spare parts support for the C-7 fleet. I question that dedicated service would pro[vide]