Page:Airmobility 1961-1971.pdf/120

1st Aviation Brigade assigned one combat aviation battalion headquarters in direct support of each infantry division and this battalion headquarters normally worked with that division no matter how many companies might be assigned for a specific mission.

At this time the 52d Aviation Battalion supported the 4th Division in the highlands, the 10th Aviation Battalion supported the brigade of the 101st and the Republic of Korea division, the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion supported the Big Red One, the 214th—the 9th Division, and the 269th—the 25th Division. The 13th Battalion, which was later to become a full group, remained in the Delta. Two aviation groups—the 17th and the 12th—supervised the aviation assets in the II and III Corps Tactical Zones respectively. The aviation group commander was also the aviation officer for the U.S. Field Force commander.

During the spring of 1966, one of the most emotionally packed debates was reaching its final stages. This would culminate on 6 April 1966 in a formal agreement between the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force to relinquish Army claims to the Caribou and future fixed-wing aircraft designed for tactical airlift. Before discussing this issue, we should put a few basic points into focus.

The keystone to airmobility was—and is—the helicopter and it is easy to forget the versatility and uniqueness of this vehicle. Many futile discussions have been held on the cost, ton-mile capacity, complexity, and limitations of the helicopter when either comparing it to fixed-wing transport or other means of mobility. The simple fact is that no other machine could have possibly accomplished the job of the helicopter. It alone had true vertical capability and could perform those scores of missions ranging from an insertion of a long range patrol to the vertical assault of an entire division; it alone could place artillery on the mountain tops and resupply these isolated bases; it alone could evacuate the wounded out of a chimney landing zone, surrounded by 100 foot trees it alone could elevate the infantry support weapons and deliver that discreet measure of fire so dear to the survival of a squad. Only the helicopter could place a small bulldozer on a critical piece of terrain or extract another aircraft downed in the jungles and return it to fly again.

Therefore, in discussing the inter-service differences between the Army and the Air Force, one must keep in mind that the heli[copter]