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double row of ambushes. The artillery then began firing 12,000 to 13,000 rounds per day into the enemy concentrations. The Air Force assisted with tactical strikes and also hit the enemy with B-52 raids almost daily. The North Vietnamese, under this pressure, attempted to escape out of the area and triggered several of the prepared ambushes. The enemy's powerful 2d Regiment was disorganized by heavy losses in these ambushes; the survivors evaded to the north into the A Lao Valley and were not in contact again for several months.

During the final phase of Operation CRAZY HORSE, Republic of Korea forces maintained contact with an enemy battalion for four days, inflicting heavy casualties. In this operation the Division evacuated or destroyed 45 tons of rice, 10 tons of salt, a weapons repair shop, and several large caches of ammunition and medical supplies. Captured documents gave the first indications of the extent of the Viet Cong infrastructure in northeastern Binh Dinh. It was this intelligence that provided targets for ensuing operations

After CRAZY HORSE, there was a pause in the Battle of Binh Dinh that lasted until early September, while the Division concentrated on battlefields to the west and south. With overlapping operations PAUL REVERE (Pleiku Province), HAWTHORNE (Kontum Province) and NATHAN HALE (Phu Yen Province) taking place many miles apart, the Division's logistics were put to a severe test.

Complicating the 1st Cavalry's maintenance and supply problems was the fact that the Division had far too many nonstandard items in the inventory. This made it almost totally dependent on an unpredictable supply system for repair parts and replacements. There were cases in which items, such as bulldozer parts, were not replaced for more than ten months because they were "special" and not stocked in country. There were several unique supply systems, such as those for aircraft parts and electronic components, operating simultaneously in Vietnam, in addition to the military standard requisitioning and issue procedures.

As for the span of control within an airmobile division, every brigade could handle four maneuver battalions with ease and a fifth battalion with minor communication augmentation at brigade headquarters. The division, in turn, could absorb two additional brigades, for a total of five, provided each of the added brigades brings along its support slice. Therefore, logistics became a restraining factor long before span of control or communications.